Flyegypt have pranged 3 Boeing 737s in the past week - action needs to be taken
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Flyegypt have pranged 3 Boeing 737s in the past week - action needs to be taken
This is now a very serious situation, requiring urgent attention by European and Egyptian aviation regulators. Within 1 week Flyegypt have had 3 major incidents involving their B737s in 3 different landings.
A Flyegypt B737-800 (SU-TMJ) from Hurghada to Frankfurt on 8 October 21 had a major failure of the outboard wheel on the right-hand main gear on landing. Simply put the entire wheel split into two pieces. On landing.
On 9 October 21, another of their aircraft, SU-TMG, burst and shredded the inboard tire on the right-hand main gear on landing at Paris CDG. Engineers were able to replace this wheel and the aircraft departed around 2 & 1/2 hours late.
Most recently, on 15 October 21, a Flyegypt Boeing 737-700, registration SU-TMM performing flight FT-3103 from Hurghada to Cluj (Romania) with 113 people on board, landed on Cluj's runway 25 at 19:12L, when upon touchdown tower immediately observed sparks and flames from the landing gear. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway with all four main tyres burst about 1028 meters past the displaced runway threshold.
Boeing make strong aircraft. When an airline starts breaking strong aircraft at the rate of 3 a week its time for regulators to shut this airline down.
I would appeal to members who have influence with regulatory bodies or aviation news media to flag this unacceptable state of affairs.
A Flyegypt B737-800 (SU-TMJ) from Hurghada to Frankfurt on 8 October 21 had a major failure of the outboard wheel on the right-hand main gear on landing. Simply put the entire wheel split into two pieces. On landing.
On 9 October 21, another of their aircraft, SU-TMG, burst and shredded the inboard tire on the right-hand main gear on landing at Paris CDG. Engineers were able to replace this wheel and the aircraft departed around 2 & 1/2 hours late.
Most recently, on 15 October 21, a Flyegypt Boeing 737-700, registration SU-TMM performing flight FT-3103 from Hurghada to Cluj (Romania) with 113 people on board, landed on Cluj's runway 25 at 19:12L, when upon touchdown tower immediately observed sparks and flames from the landing gear. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway with all four main tyres burst about 1028 meters past the displaced runway threshold.
Boeing make strong aircraft. When an airline starts breaking strong aircraft at the rate of 3 a week its time for regulators to shut this airline down.
I would appeal to members who have influence with regulatory bodies or aviation news media to flag this unacceptable state of affairs.
4HP, don't jump to conclusions - unacceptability.
Remember that failure probabilities - likelihood, have no time scale, limit, or favoured few.
If it can happen, it will, but when; again and again.
Remember that failure probabilities - likelihood, have no time scale, limit, or favoured few.
If it can happen, it will, but when; again and again.
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Setting the park brake on a B737 requires a couple of very deliberate actions and I would have thought highly unlikely.
Mishandled landing with Antiskid Inop. will do it easily however.
Mishandled landing with Antiskid Inop. will do it easily however.
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safetypee
safetypee -- with respect... I may be misunderstanding your point, but if you are suggesting that likelihood does not or should not take recent known events into consideration you are either misunderstanding or mis-applying the concept. If you were conducting a risk assessment of the likelihood of Boeing 737 landing gear incidents globally (all carriers, all destinations) your position can be defended. If, on the other hand, you were conducting a risk assessment today of the specific likelihood of a FlyEgypt incident related to the landing gear or wheels, and you did not apply a higher likelihood than you would have three weeks ago, you need to read up on factors affecting likelihood.
safetypee -- with respect... I may be misunderstanding your point, but if you are suggesting that likelihood does not or should not take recent known events into consideration you are either misunderstanding or mis-applying the concept. If you were conducting a risk assessment of the likelihood of Boeing 737 landing gear incidents globally (all carriers, all destinations) your position can be defended. If, on the other hand, you were conducting a risk assessment today of the specific likelihood of a FlyEgypt incident related to the landing gear or wheels, and you did not apply a higher likelihood than you would have three weeks ago, you need to read up on factors affecting likelihood.
Sam, “… likelihood does not or should not take recent known events into consideration”
My limited understanding of probability theory requires care in differentiating events involving knowledge of cause (first event), which might then be related to subsequent events; from those without evidence of cause - correlation is not a cause - dependant or independent events.
#1 suggest that there have been three separate technical events (not identical), but erroneously concludes that the ‘cause’, is the operator; … we don't know.
My limited understanding of probability theory requires care in differentiating events involving knowledge of cause (first event), which might then be related to subsequent events; from those without evidence of cause - correlation is not a cause - dependant or independent events.
#1 suggest that there have been three separate technical events (not identical), but erroneously concludes that the ‘cause’, is the operator; … we don't know.
Three unrelated gear events in a week seems unlikely, theres probably a root cause.
I remember many years ago the Monday morning PIA 777 in MAN had a brake fire on each arrival, to the point that the fire services would be waiting without being called. It was traced back to the fact that the MAN service was the first flight after maintenance for each aircraft and an engineer had been dipping the brake pads in lacquer to make them look shiny and new.
I remember many years ago the Monday morning PIA 777 in MAN had a brake fire on each arrival, to the point that the fire services would be waiting without being called. It was traced back to the fact that the MAN service was the first flight after maintenance for each aircraft and an engineer had been dipping the brake pads in lacquer to make them look shiny and new.
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safetypee... Thanks for the response. We are closer on this than may be apparent.
I certainly agree that we don't know the cause(s) yet and therefore cannot come to conclusions re correlation. But the point of mitigation in safety sensitive endeavours like aviation is to, at times, take proactive steps to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence, sometimes long before we have direct evidence of cause or contributing factors. The MAX grounding is of course a recent example, but others come to mind re groundings or restricting certain ops until more is known.
Such decisions cannot be taken lightly but on occasion prudence dictates we must modify or eliminate certain operations until we do know more about cause. Much easier (and more defensible) to justify taking such action than not doing so, if another, more serious, event were to occur.
And, at its root, this is not a regulatory problem. In my (far too many) years directly involved in airline, airport and ANS ops and safety, it is the service provider (company) with a mature safety culture that will take risk mitigation action long before a regulator. In the (hypothetical) best world that is how it should be.
I certainly agree that we don't know the cause(s) yet and therefore cannot come to conclusions re correlation. But the point of mitigation in safety sensitive endeavours like aviation is to, at times, take proactive steps to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence, sometimes long before we have direct evidence of cause or contributing factors. The MAX grounding is of course a recent example, but others come to mind re groundings or restricting certain ops until more is known.
Such decisions cannot be taken lightly but on occasion prudence dictates we must modify or eliminate certain operations until we do know more about cause. Much easier (and more defensible) to justify taking such action than not doing so, if another, more serious, event were to occur.
And, at its root, this is not a regulatory problem. In my (far too many) years directly involved in airline, airport and ANS ops and safety, it is the service provider (company) with a mature safety culture that will take risk mitigation action long before a regulator. In the (hypothetical) best world that is how it should be.
The only conclusion(s) that can be drawn from the three events are that none can be drawn (yet).
I'd be interested to know what "action needs to be taken" that would mitigate what appear to be 3 entirely different failure modes.
I'd be interested to know what "action needs to be taken" that would mitigate what appear to be 3 entirely different failure modes.
It is obvious that there is no firm conclusion available yet but if one operator has 3 similar events, especially in the short time period, that a bit more than a raised eyebrow seems worthwhile. I would hope the regulator would drop in and have a chat to see if there's a link.
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According to one poster on avherald the 737 releases the parking brake as soon as you select gear down. Never tried it, so can't confirm that. Nonetheless I see no reason to set the parking brake in flight...
flyfan
"According to one poster on avherald the 737 releases the parking brake as soon as you select gear down."
If so, that would make sense.
If not, one would have expected Murphy to find that out at some point over the last 50-odd years ...
"According to one poster on avherald the 737 releases the parking brake as soon as you select gear down."
If so, that would make sense.
If not, one would have expected Murphy to find that out at some point over the last 50-odd years ...
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DaveReidUK
None other than James Reason (and others whose day-to-day work involves aviation safety) would disagree with your first sentence, if by stating that, you are suggesting that these occurrences don't warrant an immediate look at the company's safety culture. The nature of any mitigating "action(s) to be taken" would arise from any common contributors identified in the analysis of each event, i.e. training (maintenance and ops) safety culture, procedures (maintenance and ops), organisational issues, etc.
The notion that several seemingly unrelated events is cause for concern, and therefore a review of some sort should take place, is incorporated into ICAO's safety oversight guidance material, and into the specific audit / surveillance criteria for many civil aviation regulators (CASA Australia, Transport Canada as examples).
“An insight into the safety health of an organisation can be gained by an examination of its safety history and of the environment within which it operates. A series of apparently unrelated safety events may be regarded as tokens of an underlying systemic failure of the overall safety system.” (see Reason, Human Error (1990))
None other than James Reason (and others whose day-to-day work involves aviation safety) would disagree with your first sentence, if by stating that, you are suggesting that these occurrences don't warrant an immediate look at the company's safety culture. The nature of any mitigating "action(s) to be taken" would arise from any common contributors identified in the analysis of each event, i.e. training (maintenance and ops) safety culture, procedures (maintenance and ops), organisational issues, etc.
The notion that several seemingly unrelated events is cause for concern, and therefore a review of some sort should take place, is incorporated into ICAO's safety oversight guidance material, and into the specific audit / surveillance criteria for many civil aviation regulators (CASA Australia, Transport Canada as examples).
“An insight into the safety health of an organisation can be gained by an examination of its safety history and of the environment within which it operates. A series of apparently unrelated safety events may be regarded as tokens of an underlying systemic failure of the overall safety system.” (see Reason, Human Error (1990))
Last edited by Sam Asama; 18th Oct 2021 at 04:58.
4HolerPoler - did I read that right? You're a moderator?
To be honest with you I think your post is kinda ridiculous. And it's this kind of thing that has driven many of the professional posters on this forum away. I dip in every few months, but usually regret it.
To be honest with you I think your post is kinda ridiculous. And it's this kind of thing that has driven many of the professional posters on this forum away. I dip in every few months, but usually regret it.